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2EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM
1. The Commission, by Regulation (EC) No 1810/991 of 17 August 1999, imposed
provisional countervailing duties on imports into the Community of polyethylene
terephthalate (‘PET’) film originating in India, following an investigation into
injurious subsidisation and the Community interest aspects of this case.
2. The Commission considered all the views expressed by interested parties in relation to
these provisional measures before drawing their final conclusions.
3. The Commission confirms its provisional conclusions to the effect that imports into
the Community of the product under consideration originating in India were being
subsidised and were causing material injury to the Community industry, and conclude
that it is in the Community's interest to take protective measures in the form of
definitive countervailing duties and to collect definitively the provisional duties at the
duty rate definitively imposed.
4. The provisional measures were in the form of ad valorem duties, ranging from 6,7 %
to 37,2 %.
5. In the light of the different claims made by the Government of India and the exporting
producers, the calculations of subsidisation and the rates of duty for all co-operating
Indian exporting producers were revised downwards for the proposed definitive
countervailing duties, but remain for all Indian exporting producers in the range of
3.8% - 19.1%.
6. The level of measures for the co-operating Indian exporting producers corresponds
either to the margins of subsidisation found or the injury elimination margins
established, whichever was lower. The residual duty was set at the level of the highest
rate that has been established for the cooperating companies.
7. The attached draft Council Regulation contains detailed information as regards the
data and motivation on the basis of which the proposed measures have been
established.
8. The interested parties were informed of the essential facts and considerations on the
basis of which the Commission proposes to the Council the imposition of definitive
countervailing duties, and were given an opportunity to comment. The comments were
taken into account where appropriate.
9. In the Anti-Dumping Committee of 20 October fourteen Member States were in
favour of the proposal and one Member State abstained.
1 OJ L 219, 19.8.1999, p. 14.
3Proposal for a
COUNCIL REGULATION
imposing a definitive countervailing duty on imports of polyethylene terephthalate
(PET) film originating in India and collecting definitively the provisional duty imposed
THE COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
Having regard to the Treaty establishing the European Community,
Having regard to Council Regulation (EC) No 2026/97 of 6 October 1997 on protection
against subsidised imports from countries not members of the European Community2 and in
particular Article 15 thereof,
After consulting the Advisory Committee,
Whereas:
1. PROCEDURE
(1) By Commission Regulation No 1810/993 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the provisional
duty Regulation’), a provisional countervailing duty was imposed on imports of
polyethylene terephthalate (‘PET’) film into the Community originating in India
falling within CN codes 3920 62 19 and 3920 62 90.
(2) Subsequent to the imposition of the provisional countervailing duty, the Indian
cooperating exporting producers Ester Industries Ltd, Flex Industries Ltd, Garware
Polyester Ltd, India Polyfilms Ltd/Jindal Polyester Ltd (related companies), MTZ
Polyesters Ltd, Polyplex Corp. Ltd (hereinafter referred to as "the Indian exporting
producers"), the Government of India (hereinafter referred to as "GOI"), the
complainant Community producers (hereinafter referred to as "the Community
industry") and two users of PET film submitted comments in writing.
(3) In accordance with the provisions of Article 11(5) of the Basic Regulation, all above
parties except for one user requested and were granted hearings.
(4) One user, which did not make itself known at an earlier stage, reacted further to the
imposition of the provisional measures.
(5) The Commission continued to seek and verify all information it deemed necessary
for the definitive findings.
2 OJ L 288, 21.10.1997, p. 1
3 OJ L 219, 19.8.1999, p. 14.
4(6) The oral and written comments submitted after the imposition of provisional
measures and after the above disclosures were considered and, where deemed
appropriate, taken into account in the definitive findings.
2. PRODUCT UNDER CONSIDERATION
(7) The provisional duty Regulation, recital seven described the product under
consideration to be polyethylene terephthalate (‘PET’) film.
(8) Recital eight of the provisional duty Regulation stated further that the product can be
split into a variety of segments typically identified within the industry as magnetic,
packaging, electrical, imaging and other industrial segments and that for the purposes
of the investigation, the products were grouped in types according to market
segment, thickness, coating properties, surface treatment, mechanical properties and
clarity/opacity.
(9) After the imposition of provisional measures the Commission received a request by
the Community industry to consider not only the types classifiable within CN codes
3920 62 19 and 3920 62 90 as set out in the provisional duty Regulation but also
those classifiable under CN codes 3920 62 11 and 3920 62 13 as PET film. The
Indian exporting producers opposed to inclusion of the two additional codes claiming
that the PET film classifiable under them is not interchangeable with the PET film
falling under the other two codes, i.e. 3920 62 19 and 3920 62 90. They pointed out
that only these latter codes were included in the complaint of the Community
industry and that the two former ones had not been specifically included in the
complaint on the grounds that the product categorised under these codes were not
interchangeable with those classified under CN codes 3920 62 19 and 3920 62 90.
(10) On the basis of the information collected in the course of the investigation, the
Commission decided not to include CN codes 3920 62 11 and 3920 62 13 within the
scope of the investigation as no information has been submitted which would suggest
that the claim made by the Community industry in the complaint in terms of lack of
interchangeability is not correct.
3. SUBSIDIES
3.1 GENERAL SUBMISSIONS
3.1.1 Addition of interest in the calculation of benefits obtained
(11) The exporting producers requested to withdraw the interest element that had been
added in order to calculate the total amount of benefit obtained under the various
schemes. It was claimed that the addition of interest was unwarranted, beyond the
terms of the Agreement on subsidies and countervailing measures (ASCM) and
prohibited under Article VI paragraph 3 GATT 1994. The Calculation Guidelines of
the Commission would be null and void in this respect.
(12) The legal basis for the addition of interest to the face value of the subsidy is Article 5
in conjunction with Article 6 of the Basic Regulation. Article 5 states that the amount
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the recipient which is found to exist during the investigation period for subsidisation.
Article 6, which reproduces Article 14 of the ASCM, establishes rules for calculation
of the benefit for certain types of subsidies. For all categories of subsidies mentioned
in Article 6, i.e. provision of equity, loans, loan guarantees and goods and services or
purchase of goods, the benchmark for determining the benefit is the equivalent cost
of funds on the commercial market. Therefore, by applying the rationale contained in
Article 6 as a general rule to all categories of subsidies, in order to encompass the
full benefit, the costs of borrowing the funds at commercial rates must be included.
(13) When expressed as a face value during the investigation period, all subsidies are
effectively equivalent to a grant. Since non-repayable grants are not available
commercially, the recipient, in the absence of such a grant, would have had to raise
the equivalent amount from commercial sources and repay it with interest over a
period of time. It is this element of the benefit which is covered by adding interest to
the nominal subsidy amount.
(14) This approach is specifically provided for in the Commission’s Guidelines for the
calculation of the amount of subsidy in countervailing duty investigations
(Calculation Guidelines)4 and is the Community’s standing practice which has been
followed in a number of previous cases.
(15) Article VI paragraph 3 GATT 1994, which is reproduced in Article 19.4 of the
ASCM, only states that duties must not be levied in excess of the amount of the
subsidy. The amount of the subsidy is calculated in terms of benefit found to exist in
the investigation period (Article 14 ASCM). Since the company also benefited from
the fact that it did not have to source the funds on the financial market, the amount of
benefit must also include an interest element. Consequently, since the amount of
benefit (including interest) corresponds to the amount of the subsidy and the
countervailing duty is calculated in terms of the subsidy margin found, Article VI
paragraph 3 GATT 1994 is fully respected by the addition of interest.
(16) For these reasons, the claim to exclude the interest element in the calculation of the
benefits obtained under the various schemes is rejected.
3.1.2 Specificity of the various schemes
(17) The exporting producers submitted that the presumption in Article 2.3 of the ASCM
rendering subsidies contingent upon export performance specific will not ipso facto
apply, since Article 27.2 of the ASCM provides that the prohibition of subsidies
contingent upon export performance shall not apply to developing countries. India is
one of the countries listed in Annex VII of the ASCM, and therefore the export
subsidies granted by the Government of India (GOI) would not be prohibited. As a
consequence, the Commission would be under obligation to demonstrate on the basis
of positive evidence that the schemes in question are specific.
(18) Article 3(4)(a) of the Basic Regulation clearly states that subsidies, including those
illustrated in Annex I, shall be deemed to be specific if they are, in law or in fact,
4 OJ C 394, 17.12.1998, p. 7. "The face value of the amount of the subsidy has to be transformed into the
value prevailing during the investigation period through the application of the normal commercial
interest rate".
6contingent upon export performance. This condition has been individually examined
for each of the subsidy schemes subject to this proceeding.
3.2 INDIVIDUAL SCHEMES
3.2.1 Passbook Scheme (PBS)
(19) The Government of India (GOI) and the exporting producers raised arguments
regarding this scheme, which is described in recitals 12 to 19 of the provisional duty
Regulation. These arguments need not be addressed, given that the benefits obtained
under this were not included in the amounts of duty provisionally established for the
reasons given in recital 24 of the provisional duty Regulation. Consequently, no
measures will be imposed on benefits under this scheme and, therefore, no definitive
finding is required.
3.2.2 Duty Entitlement Passbook Scheme – pre-export basis
(20) The GOI and the exporting producers raised arguments regarding this scheme, which
was described in recitals 26 to 30 of the provisional duty Regulation.
(21) In particular, it was claimed that the DEPB pre-export scheme is a permitted
remission/drawback scheme within the provisions of the Basic Regulation, and, as
such, is non-countervailable. It was also claimed that, should the scheme be found to
be countervailable, only actual excess remissions should be used as a basis for the
calculation of the benefit, and the Commission should have examined whether there
was in fact an excess drawback of import charges on inputs consumed in the
production process.
(22) The DEPB on pre-export basis is not a remission/drawback or substitution scheme
within the provisions of the Basic Regulation, despite the existence of the ‘Actual
User Condition’. It is fundamentally a value, and not quantity based scheme. The
DEPB rate, which gives rise to import duty exemption, is not calculated in relation to
specific physical quantities of inputs actually consumed or to be consumed in the
production process. Concretely, inputs are determined on the basis of Standard
Input/Output Norms (SION) which set notional costings based on what are
considered to be the values of inputs that have to be imported to manufacture a
particular product. Once the DEPB rate has been set for a particular finished product,
inputs can be imported duty free under a DEPB pre-export licence. There is no
mechanism in place which would prevent an exporting producer from shifting the
ratios of his inputs actually imported, since he is only required to remain within the
overall credit ceiling granted.
(23) In addition, there is no obligation to actually import all different inputs for which
credit has been granted. The only limits to the quantity of any particular input that
may be imported under the scheme is the value of the licence granted and the
corresponding commitment to export the finished product. Therefore, there is no
requirement that the imported inputs being substituted must be equal in quantity to,
and have the same quality and characteristics as the home market inputs.
(24) A company which can obtain its inputs at a lower value or which sources some of the
inputs on the domestic market, would be able to import duty free inputs that could be
used for domestic production or sale since the actual imported quantities will have no
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or procedure in place to confirm either which duty-free inputs are actually consumed
in the production process of the exported finished product or in what quantities.
Furthermore, it has been found that the offset that may take place when goods are
exported is not carried out on the basis of actual quantities of duty free imported
inputs used in the processing of the exported products, but rather on the basis of
standard value assumptions concerning inputs of the exported product.
(25) Even if the DEPB – pre-export basis were to be considered a duty draw-back system,
as alleged, Annex II(II)(5) and Annex III(II)(3) of the Basic Regulation provide that,
where it is determined that the government of the exporting country does not have a
verification system in place, a further examination by the exporting country based on
actual inputs involved, or actual transactions, respectively, will normally need to be
carried out in the context of determining whether an excess payment occurred. Since,
as explained above, no such verification system of actual quantities of imported
inputs exists, the GOI was required to undertake an examination. The GOI did not
carry out such an examination. Therefore, the Commission did not examine whether
there was in fact an excess drawback of import charges on inputs consumed in the
production of the exported product.
(26) In any event, the excess remission of import duties is the basis for calculating the
amount of the benefit only in the case of bona fide drawback and substitution
drawback schemes. Since it has been established that the DEPB pre-export scheme is
not a drawback or substitution drawback scheme within the meaning of Annex I (i)
and Annexes II and III of the Basic Regulation, the benefit is the total remission of
import duties, not any supposed excess remission.
(27) As the DEPB pre-export scheme involves government revenue that is otherwise due
being forgone, the scheme is considered to confer a subsidy under Article 2.1(a)(ii)
of the Basic Regulation. Since benefit under the scheme cannot be obtained without
an export commitment, the scheme is contingent in law upon export performance
within the meaning of Article 3.4(a) of the Basic Regulation, and is therefore
specific.
Calculation of the subsidy amount
(28) The benefit to the exporting producers has been calculated as explained in recital 23
of the provisional duty Regulation, taking additionally into account application fees
which have been claimed by the exporting producers. These additional amounts had,
however, no influence on the provisionally calculated subsidy margins.
(29) Two companies benefited from this scheme during the investigation period and
obtained subsidies of 1,31% and 6,84%.
3.2.3 Duty Entitlement Passbook Scheme – post-export basis
(30) The GOI and the exporting producers raised arguments regarding this scheme, which
was described in recitals 37 to 39 of the provisional duty Regulation.
(31) In particular, it was claimed that the DEPBS on post-export basis would be a
permissible substitution drawback scheme since DEPB post-exports credits would be
granted only in accordance with notified SION. Under paragraph (I) of Annex I of
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market inputs equal to, and having the same quality and characteristics as the
imported inputs. It was also claimed that the Excise Authorities would be in a
position to verify which imported inputs are incorporated into the exported product.
Accordingly, the DEPBS on post-export basis would be a permissible substitution
drawback scheme under Annex II of the Basic Regulation.
(32) It should be recalled that, contrary to the DEPBS on pre-export basis, no ‘actual user
condition’ exists. The credits on the DEPBS on post-export basis are calculated as a
percentage of the value of exported finished products. Credits thus obtained can be
used to offset customs duties normally due on imports of any goods (excluding those
on the negative list of imports). There is no restriction to goods for use in the
production of the exported product. Imported goods may be sold on the domestic
market or used in any other way. Moreover, licences, and thus credits, are freely
transferable.
(33) Consequently, it can be concluded that the DEPBS on post-export basis is not a
drawback or substitution drawback scheme within the meaning of Annex I (i) and
Annexes II and III of the Basic Regulation.
(34) The GOI also claimed that the scheme constitutes an export subsidy only to the
extent that it provides a drawback of import charges in excess of those actually
leviable in imported inputs that are used in export production, and that the
Commission has failed to discharge its obligation of determining the extent of this
excess.
(35) This claim has to be rejected for the same reasons as stated above in recital 26.
Calculation of the subsidy amount
(36) The GOI submitted that, in the case of licences being sold, the Commission would be
required to determine the actual value of the benefit derived by the exporting
producers through these sales transactions, and not on the basis of the amount of
credit granted in the licence.
(37) As already explained in recital 43 of the provisional duty Regulation, this claim
cannot be granted since the benefit granted by the GOI to the exporting producer in
terms of revenue foregone is properly reflected in the value of the licence. Selling a
licence at a price different (i.e. higher or lower) than its value represents a purely
commercial transaction which does not alter the amount of benefit originally
received from the scheme.
(38) The benefit to the exporting producers has been calculated as explained in recitals 41
to 44 of the provisional duty Regulation. In this respect, it should be noted that a
number of claims were made by four exporting producers and accepted by the
Commission. Subsequently, additional costs necessarily incurred to obtain the
licence have been taken into account. Also, corrections have been made to the
amounts of credit granted. These corrections result in minor changes of the subsidy
margins.
(39) Four companies benefited from this scheme during the investigation period and
obtained subsidies of between 2,34% and 17,68%.
93.2.4 Export Promotion Capital Goods Scheme (EPCGS)
(40) The GOI submitted that the objective of the EPCG scheme, which was described in
recitals 46 to 50 in the provisional duty Regulation, would be to permit the
technological upgrading of plant and equipment by enterprises across the economy
while also preserving India’s scarce foreign exchange resources. It was claimed that
the EPCG benefit is not contingent upon export performance because EPCG licences
are available regardless of previous export performance. Moreover, an EPCG
licence-holder can always purchase domestic rather than imported capital goods.
(41) In regard to this claim, it should be noted that to avail itself of the EPCGS, a
company must make a commitment to export a certain value of goods within a
certain time period. This scheme is therefore contingent in law upon export
performance since no benefit can be obtained without a commitment to export goods.
As such, it is deemed to be specific under the provisions of Article 3(4)(a) of the
Basic Regulation and, therefore, countervailable.
(42) The exporting producers claimed that, under the EPCGS, the Government revenue is
not foregone, but only postponed. If an importer of capital goods fails to fulfil his
export obligation by the end of the period that the scheme provides, any differential
duty will be collected with interest. Thus, the question whether an importer had
enjoyed any duty remission at all and whether the Government revenue is foregone
and, thereby a benefit is conferred, will arise only at the end of the given period for
fulfilment of the export obligation under this scheme. It would therefore be
premature to consider the import of capital goods under the scheme during the period
of investigation.
(43) In regard to this claim, it is considered that, when a company applies for this scheme
and thereby gives a commitment to export goods, it must be presumed that the export
obligation will be met and final exemption from the payment of the import duties
will be obtained. Indeed, there must be an expectation on the part of the companies
that they will finally not have to pay duties. To assume otherwise would render the
scheme meaningless.
(44) Moreover, the investigation has positively established that the GOI in fact grants
extensions of the period of export obligation to companies that are unable to meet
their export obligation within the period initially established.
(45) For these reasons, it is considered that Government revenue is foregone at the time of
importation of capital goods and the importing company receives a benefit in the
form of the total amount of unpaid duties.
Calculation of the subsidy amount
(46) The benefit to the exporting producers has been calculated as explained in recital 53
of the provisional duty Regulation. In this respect, it should be noted that a number
of claims were made by all exporting producers, which were in part accepted by the
Commission. Most notably, costs necessarily incurred in order to qualify for, or to
obtain the subsidy and for which substantiated evidence was provided were taken
into account. Those costs were notably linked to application fees and bank
guarantees. The application fee is a one time operation whereas the bank guarantees
can be a one time operation covering a period of several years for the bank guarantee
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or can be composed of several yearly instalments to be paid throughout the period of
the validity of the bank guarantee.
(47) It should be noted that, one of these companies, MTZ Polyesters Ltd, claimed that
the method applied in the provisional duty Regulation is not appropriate in its
specific case, since it had been in a totally different situation during the investigation
period than the other companies involved in the investigation. Most notably, it was
claimed that, due to unforeseen events, among which was a natural disaster,
commercial production only started in October 1998. This led to very low domestic
and export sales during the investigation period and consequently to a high subsidy
margin. The company therefore proposed and requested to use a different calculation
methodology.
(48) It should be noted that no such claim had been submitted to the Commission during
the investigation until the disclosure of provisional findings. However, with its
request, the company submitted detailed and substantiated evidence concerning the
start of commercial production and the effect that such late start had on its
operations.
(49) After careful scrutiny of this submission, the Commission concluded that the request
to adopt different calculation methodologies as proposed by the company was not
justified. However, the Commission considered that, given the specific and
exceptional circumstances affecting this company, the application of the same
denominator (i.e. actual exports) to this company as that applied to the companies
which were in a normal commercial production situation led to results of such a
disproportionate nature that they did not adequately reflect the benefit obtained by
this company from the countervailable subsidy under this scheme. Accordingly, the
Commission, while maintaining the same calculation methodology, made an
adaptation of the production and export sales figures of this company, based on
verified data from companies in a normal commercial production situation in order to
allocate the benefit conferred by the subsidy during the investigation period.
(50) In summary, six companies have availed themselves of this scheme during the
investigation period and obtained subsidies of between 1,42% and 8,75%
3.3 EXPORT PROMOTION ZONES / EXPORT ORIENTED UNITS (EPZ/EOU)
(51) The GOI submitted that it does not forgo any revenue under this scheme, which was
described in recitals 55 to 58 of the provisional duty Regulation, because customs
duties on capital goods are only suspended during the period of bonding. This means
that, on imports of capital goods for use within EPZ/EOU units, the importer is not
required to pay customs duty. However, when the capital goods are sold, or de-
bonded, the customs duty becomes payable, at a rate proportionate to the depreciated
value of the capital goods at the time of sale or de-bonding.
(52) This claim is similar to the one made by the exporting producers concerning the
EPCG scheme, i.e. revenue would not be foregone, but merely postponed. However,
to presume that capital goods would be imported duty free and then re-sold on the
domestic market, duty paid, would render the scheme meaningless. In any event,
even if capital goods were to be re-sold at a given moment in the future, revenue
would be foregone in an amount proportional to the accrued depreciation. If and
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when such capital goods are sold is a merely commercial decision taken by the
company.
(53) For these reasons, it is considered that Government revenue is foregone at the time of
importation of capital goods and the importing company receives a benefit in the
form of the total amount of unpaid duties.
(54) The exporting producer made a similar claim, and additionally presented arguments
relating to the imports of inputs for exported products. Since the EPZ/EOU scheme
was used exclusively for the import of capital goods, these additional arguments need
not be addressed.
(55) This subsidy is contingent in law upon export performance within the meaning of
Article 3(4)(a) of the Basic Regulation, since it cannot be obtained without the
company accepting an exporting obligation, and therefore deemed to be specific.
Calculation of the subsidy amount
(56) The benefit of the exporting producer has been calculated as explained in recital 63
to 65 of the provisional duty Regulation. One company received benefits under this
scheme at a rate of 0,7%.
3.3.1 Income Tax Exemption Scheme
(57) As already established in the provisional duty Regulation, no exporting producer
made use of this scheme. Consequently, no measures were imposed and no definitive
finding is required in the context of the investigation.
3.4 REGIONAL SCHEMES
3.4.1 Sales tax
(58) The exporting producers submitted that the benefit bestowed under the Sales Tax
Exemptions of the States of Gujarat and Maharashtra and the Trade Tax Incentive
Scheme of the State of Uttar Pradesh is conferred to the purchaser of the goods, and
not the seller.
(59) Sales or trade tax in these States is a tax levied on sales of goods, and added to the
sales prices on the invoice. The seller thereby acts as a tax collector. The sales/trade
tax system differs from VAT systems in that sales/trade tax paid cannot be offset
against sales/trade tax collected.
(60) It has been claimed that the Sales or Trade Tax Exemptions have been used by the
companies exclusively for sales transactions, and not for any substantial purchases of
goods.
(61) The Commission, during the verification visit, has found no evidence to the contrary.
It was also established that all major suppliers of inputs for the exporting producers
are located outside the States concerned. Therefore, sales tax was payable on
purchases of goods by the exporting producers.
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(62) It can therefore be concluded that the Sales Tax Exemptions granted by the States of
Gujarat and Maharashtra and the Trade Tax Incentive Scheme granted by the State of
Uttar Pradesh conferred no benefit upon the exporting producer.
(63) No measures will be imposed and, therefore, no definitive findings on these schemes
are required. Finally, it should be noted that these findings do not prejudice findings
concerning the usage of these schemes for purchase transactions.
3.4.2 Regional schemes - Electricity duty exemption
(64) The GOI and one exporting producer, MTZ Polyesters Ltd, submitted that this
scheme, which was described in recitals 80 and 81 of the provisional duty
Regulation, would not be specific, since it would be available to all new enterprises
in Gujarat, regardless of where they are located.
(65) The Commission analysed the evidence submitted in order to substantiate this claim.
After a careful examination, it can be concluded that, even though some unclear
wording in the relevant legislation appears to have been used, notably in the context
of defining ‘service undertakings’ and setting differential duty rates, this scheme is
indeed available to all new industrial undertakings within the State on an equal basis
and during a period of five years.
(66) Article 3(2)(b) of the Basic Regulation stipulates that where the granting authority, or
the legislation pursuant to which the granting authority operates, establishes
objective criteria or conditions governing the eligibility for, and the amount of, a
subsidy, specificity shall not exist provided that eligibility is automatic and such
criteria and conditions are strictly adhered to. Such objective criteria and conditions
should, inter alia, be horizontal in application and not favour certain enterprises over
others.
(67) In the light of the submissions received and evidence verified in this investigation, it
is considered that the scheme meets the criteria of Article 3(2)(b) of the Basic
Regulation, including inter alia because it is horizontal in application, since it is
available to enterprises in the whole State, and based on objective criteria, namely
the creation of new industrial undertakings.
(68) It is therefore concluded that this scheme is not specific and therefore not
countervailable.
3.4.3 Regional schemes - Octroi refund
(69) Concerning the Octroi refund, which was described in recitals 88 to 89 of the
provisional duty Regulation, the GOI submitted that the Octroi is an indirect tax
levied by local authorities in India on goods that enter the territorial units of a town
or a district. It was argued that the ‘Guidelines on consumption of inputs in the
production process’ in Annex II of the ASCM would permit indirect tax rebate
schemes of prior stage cumulative indirect taxes levied on imports that are consumed
in the production of exported products. Therefore, this scheme would not be
countervailable.
(70) This argument has to be dismissed, since the Octroi refund scheme has no link
whatsoever to export production.
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(71) No substantiated claims regarding specificity of this scheme have been submitted. It
is therefore confirmed that this scheme is specific in accordance with Article 3(2)(a)
and (c) of the Basic Regulation since it is explicitly limited to certain enterprises,
which are located in designated areas, within the jurisdiction of the granting
authority.
(72) One exporting producer, Garware Polyester Ltd, submitted that it had obtained no
benefit under this scheme during the IP since the State Authorities of Maharashtra
had not yet actually fulfilled his repayment obligation.
(73) This argument has to be rejected, since the benefit obtained is the accrued claim
against the State of Maharashtra, to which the company is legally entitled.
(74) The GOI, supported by the exporting producers, reiterated a general green-light
claim and submitted that the Commission, especially in the case of developing
countries, would be under an obligation to establish that backward regions are not
eligible under Article 4(3) of the Basic Regulation, rather than making a
determination based on facts available.
(75) In this respect, it should be noted that, in so far as this scheme is concerned, which
was used only by one company located in the area of Aurangabat within the State of
Maharashtra, no evidence was submitted within the deadlines applicable to this
proceeding by the GOI or by any other party in relation to the fulfilment of the
requirements contained in Article 4(3) of the Basic Regulation. Certain evidence,
which was limited to data stemming from 1981/82, was submitted considerably
beyond the deadline. In these circumstances, the Commission is neither under an
obligation nor in a position to establish that the criteria required for a determination
under Article 4(3) of the Basic Regulation, including inter alia those relating to the
measurement of economic development based on statistical evidence, are met in the
case of this scheme.
(76) Under these circumstances, the Commission is under an obligation to confirm the
findings as outlined in recital 93 of the provisional duty Regulation. It is therefore
definitively concluded that this scheme is countervailable.
Calculation of the subsidy amount
(77) The benefit to the exporting producer has been calculated as explained in recital 94
of the provisional duty Regulation. However, the company provided evidence that it
was not entitled to a refund of the full amount of tax, which consequently led to a
lower subsidy margin.
(78) One company benefited from this scheme during the investigation period and
obtained subsidies of 1,08%.
3.4.4 Capital incentive
(79) The Government of India (GOI) and the exporting producers raised arguments
regarding this scheme, which is described in recitals 96 and 97 of the provisional
Regulation. These arguments need not be addressed, given that the benefits obtained
under this were not included in the amounts of duty provisionally established for the
reasons given in recital 24 of the provisional duty Regulation. Consequently, no
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measures will be imposed on benefits under this scheme and, therefore, no definitive
finding is required.
Amount of countervailable subsidies
(80) The amount of countervailable subsidies in accordance with the provisions of the
Basic Regulation, expressed ad valorem, for each investigated exporter is as follows.
In %
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17.68 1.42 19.1
4. INJURY
4.1 DEFINITION OF THE COMMUNITY INDUSTRY
(81) Recital 106 of the provisional duty Regulation states that four complainant producers
fulfil the requirements of Article 10(8) of the Basic Regulation, since they account
for more than 80% of total Community production of the product concerned and are
therefore deemed to constitute the Community industry within the meaning of Article
9(1) of the said Regulation.
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(82) The Indian exporting producers have alleged that the proceeding should never have
been initiated, as the complaint did not include sufficient evidence to prove that the
requirements of Article 10(8) were filled. They claimed that the fact that the captive
production of PET film was left out in the complaint means that the Commission
could not estimate the total production of PET film in the Community on the basis of
the complaint. This allegation was considered unfounded as the captively produced
PET film never entered the open Community market as PET film but as a
downstream further processed product. In any event, the level of non-captive
production of the complainant producers was substantially sufficient for standing to
be established.
(83) Therefore, the findings set out in recitals 105 and 106 of the provisional duty
Regulation are hereby confirmed.
4.2 COMMUNITY CONSUMPTION, IMPORT VOLUMES AND MARKET SHARE
(84) The conclusions reached by the Commission at the provisional stage, notably the
existence of significant increases of total Indian exports of the product concerned,
and a substantial increase of their share of the Community market were confirmed.
(85) Therefore, the findings set out in recitals 107-110 of the provisional duty Regulation
are hereby confirmed.
4.3 PRICES OF SUBSIDISED IMPORTS
(86) The Indian exporting producers have alleged that the price comparison of the
provisional duty Regulation leads to unfair results for them, as it does not take into
account the difference in price between commodity and special types of PET film.
They have claimed that the Indian exports consist mainly of commodity type PET
film whereas an important part of PET film produced by the Community industry is
of special type. This argument had to be rejected as the aspects of commodity and
special type of PET film were taken into account in the product grouping used for the
price comparison.
(87) The Indian exporting producers have claimed further that the exclusion of certain
parts of the structure of the product grouping as defined in the questionnaire has
caused higher undercutting margins for them. They objected to the simplification of
the product type grouping after the disclosure of the provisional findings, claiming
that the simplification led to incorrect comparison for PET film types of different
quality. They claimed further that Indian product tends to be of higher shrinkage in
terms of thermal properties, narrower width and more hazy as compared to the
Community product and therefore the Indian product is of lower quality and less
expensive.
(88) On the basis of the information received in the investigation, at the provisional stage
the Commission had decided to simplify the grouping in types of different PET film
as compared to what was foreseen by the questionnaires sent to the parties
concerned. Therefore, the width, the thermal properties and the distinction between
hazy and clear film were not considered. In this respect it has to be noted that, as in
all investigations, in particular given the stage of the information collection, the
product type grouping set out in the questionnaire in this case was indicative and
open to modification. The present investigation has shown that a product grouping
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differentiation by PET film width would have multiplied the number of product types
to be compared significantly without a clear impact on price comparison.
Furthermore, the inclusion of thermal properties and the distinction between hazy
and clear film was not possible as for haziness it turned out that no clear definition
exists for this characteristic and for thermal properties the definition given in the
questionnaires was not consistently followed by the parties concerned. This led to a
situation in which both the Community producers and the Indian exporting producers
had used different and incomparable definitions for them.
(89) The above allegation of the Indian producing companies has been disregarded, not
only because the simplification of the product grouping was inevitable to guarantee a
manageable undercutting exercise with representative comparisons of the product
groupings declared by both parties concerned (actually around 400 Community
industry product grouping codes were compared with about 160 PCN codes of the
Indian exporting producers), but also as the undercutting determination already in a
simplified form reflects sufficiently the differences in terms of physical
characteristics between the types produced by the Indian exporting producers and by
the Community industry.
(90) All the Indian exporting producers also requested a level of trade adjustment. They
argued that whereas they sell a major proportion of their PET film to importers in the
Community, the Community industry is mainly selling directly to converters of PET
film. Therefore, they claimed that the comparison for the purposes of undercutting
should be made between the importers’ resale prices to converters and the prices
offered by the Community industry. They submitted that the margin an importer
receives from its sales to converters is about 25%, which represents the requested
level of trade adjustment.
(91) In this respect it has to be noted that in the questionnaire the Commission defined the
levels of trade as being 1) distributors, 2) converters, 3) OEM, 4) end users and 5)
others. The Indian exporting producers have declared in their questionnaire replies
that a major proportion of their sales of PET film in Europe is sold to group number
five, i.e. “others”, without any further clarification. After the disclosure on
provisional findings the Indian exporting producers have confirmed that their sales to
importers declared under “others” should be considered as sales to distributors.
However, the investigation has shown that some of these distributors are also
converting the product, indicating that the clarifications submitted by the Indian
exporting producers concerning the level of trade are inaccurate. Furthermore, the
investigation did not confirm the 25% price difference between the two levels of
trade. In fact as far as the Community industry’s sales are concerned, the average
selling price to distributors is higher than the price charged to the converters. In the
circumstances of the Indian exporting producers, this would mean that any
adjustment to be made would actually increase the price undercutting rates
determined. The fact that prices to distributors are higher than those to converters in
the case of the Community industry is explained by the fact that the converters buy
larger quantities and therefore receive a quantity discount. In the case of the Indian
exporting producers five companies out of six sold at higher prices to converters than
to distributors as submitted by them. However, one company sold at clearly higher
prices to distributors and the price difference between the two levels of trade for the
rest of the companies was far below 25%.
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(92) The investigation has also shown that the two major levels of trade are not clearly
separated due to the fact that some major companies act both as a distributor and as a
converter. It was noted further that there is no clear price difference between the two
levels as the quantity ordered seems to be a more important price factor than the level
of trade. Finally, and contrary to the allegation put forward by the Indian exporting
producers, the investigation has shown that the Community industry also sells the
product under consideration to distributors as well as to converters. Therefore it was
concluded that there are no grounds to grant the Indian exporting producers an
adjustment for a level of trade.
(93) One of the Indian exporting producers, MTZ, also requested an adjustment for a
quality difference. They submitted that they had included off grade film in their
transaction listing used for undercutting calculations and that the off grade film types
should be granted an adjustment by way of an increase of their sales price by 100%.
In this respect it should be noted that the questionnaire reply of MTZ states that the
company produces three qualities of film: A- grade, B-grade and off grade. However,
in the transaction listing no reference to different grades was made. After the
disclosure of the provisional measures, MTZ provided further information on how to
identify the off grade products in the transaction listing. Having received this
information, the Commission compared the prices between the alleged off grade
product types with the rest of the product types and concluded that there is no price
difference between the two groups of types. Therefore the request of MTZ for a
quality adjustment could not be accepted.
(94) Finally, the Indian exporting producers claimed that the Commission should have
offset negative margin of price undercutting by positive ones in their undercutting
calculations. Since this was not done, they stated that a higher injury elimination
margin had been determined. It should be noted that, in the methodology described in
recitals 112 to 114 of the provisional duty Regulation for the calculation of the price
undercutting margins, the weighted average net sales prices of the subsidised imports
were compared on a model–by-model basis with the weighted average net sales price
by model of the Community industry on the Community market. Therefore, this
methodology allowed the amount by which the exporting producers’ price in an
export transaction exceeded that of the Community industry’s weighted average
price to be taken into account on a per model basis. The argument was therefore
rejected.
(95) It follows from the above that the provisional finding set out in recital 114 of the
provisional duty Regulation of undercutting ranging between 28.2% and 50.5% are
confirmed.
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4.4 SITUATION OF THE COMMUNITY INDUSTRY
(96) The GOI claimed in general terms that based on the non-confidential responses of the
complainants the Community industry is not suffering any injury at all. In this
respect as stated in recitals 115 to 125 of the provisional duty Regulation, the
investigation has shown that the overall trends for the Community industry are
negative, notably in relation to market share and prices as well as profitability, giving
a clear indication of material injury. This trend is sufficiently confirmed in the non-
confidential responses of the Community industry.
(97) The Indian exporting producers have alleged that the choice of 1995 as a starting
year for data collected for the investigation has distorted the analysis in favour of a
finding of injury to the Community industry. They have submitted that, since 1995
was an exceptionally good year due to very high demand, it is only natural that the
injury indicators show a negative trend after that. The Indian exporting producers
claim that fixing year 1993 as a starting year would have given a more fair view as to
the evolution of the injury factors. However, the purpose of the investigation is to
evaluate the effect of the countervailable imports on the economic situation of the
Community industry during the IP. In order to make such an analysis; trends are
established for a number of indicators on the basis of information relating to a
number of years (usually three) preceding the IP. The purpose of this analysis is
therefore not to compare the starting year with the IP but rather to assess the annual
developments within the entire period considered. In any event it should be noted
that at the time the decision on the period considered was taken there was no
information available of the possibility that the injury indicators would have shown a
different pattern had an earlier starting year been chosen. Finally, it should be noted
that choosing an earlier starting year would not have been favourable to Indian
exporting companies as there has been a strong increase in their market share in the
time periods leading to the IP.
(98) Therefore, the findings stated in recitals 115 to 125 of the provisional duty regulation
are confirmed.
4.5 CONCLUSION ON INJURY
(99) Based on the above considerations, it is confirmed that the Community industry has
suffered material injury within the meaning of Article 8(1) of the Basic Regulation.
5. CAUSATION
5.1 EFFECT OF THE SUBSIDISED IMPORTS
(100) The Indian exporting producers and GOI claimed that there was no obvious
correlation between the Indian subsidised exports and the injury suffered by the
Community industry. They claimed that there has been globally a negative price
development for PET film caused by a worldwide surplus of the product coupled
with a decrease in the price of the key raw materials. The Indian exporting producers
claimed further that the PET film prices in the Community have just followed the
global negative price trend and the fact that the average price of the Community
producers declined in 1996 when the market share of the Indian exporting producers
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decreased should prove the claim. However, it should be recalled that India is one of
the major contributors to the worldwide surplus on the PET film market and that
according to EUROSTAT figures India cut its prices on the European market as early
as 1996 while the other major exporting countries the USA, Japan and South Korea
increased their prices. The fact that they lost market share in 1996 does not mean that
they were not causing injury to the Community industry through increased price
pressure resulting in a 3% decrease in the average price of the Community industry.
Finally, it should be recalled that the injury analysis is made on the basis of the IP
and that the previous years are mainly used for setting the trend.
Thus, the arguments put forward by the Indian exporting producers and GOI must be rejected.
5.2 EFFECT OF OTHER FACTORS
(101) The findings made as set out in recitals 134 to 144 of the provisional duty Regulation
are hereby confirmed with the following additions:
5.2.1 Imports from other third countries
(102) The Indian exporting producers and GOI maintained their argument about the
discriminatory aspect of investigating only imports originating in India while the
import volumes from South Korea have increased and the Korean average prices
have declined during the period considered. The Indian exporting producers claimed
that the increase in the import volumes from South Korea is likely to be even higher
than officially reported by EUROSTAT as the importers of Korean PET film are
likely to do the customs clearance occasionally under CN code 3920 6900 (other
polyesters) just as they have done for the PET film of Indian origin.
(103) The Commission maintains the arguments presented in the provisional duty
Regulation, namely that the absolute and relative increase in South Korea’s market
share has been smaller than that of India and that the prices of South Korean PET
film have systematically stayed on a higher level than the Indian prices. Furthermore,
the Korean exporting producers reduced their prices only one year later than the
Indians. As for the imports under CN code for other polyesters the Commission has
not received any evidence implying that Korean PET film could have been cleared
through customs through that code.
(104) Finally, and most importantly, it should be noted that the Commission has seen no
reason to initiate an investigation against South Korea as no evidence of unfair trade
in the form of dumping or subsidised exports being practised by the Korean
exporting producers has been brought to their attention.
(105) As based on the above, the situation with respect to imports originating in India and
South Korea are different, a situation of discrimination can not have occurred.
5.2.2 Fluctuation in the price of raw materials
(106) The Indian exporting producers have argued that on the basis of the non-confidential
questionnaire replies of the Community industry one can conclude that the average
decline in the raw material prices during the period considered has been more like
one third than 17% as stated in the provisional duty Regulation. This, they claim, is
confirmed by the publicly available information on raw material price developments.
They repeated their previous argument that a one third decrease in the price of raw
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materials permits the Community industry to reduce its prices without a
corresponding decrease in profitability and that the imports from India therefore did
not trigger the price reductions of the Community industry.
(107) It should be noted that the Commission on the basis of confidential questionnaire
replies investigated price development of all PET film raw materials as stated in
recital 140 of the provisional duty Regulation arriving at the decrease of 17%.
Furthermore, it is true that the non-confidential questionnaire replies of the
Community industry concentrated on the price development of dimethyl
terephthalate (DMT) or terephthalic acid (PTA). As the price of these raw materials
decreased more than the prices of other raw materials a decrease of 17% in total cost
of raw material is consistent with a higher decrease in the costs of DMT and PTA.
Therefore the conclusions of recital 140 of the provisional duty Regulation are
consistent with the replies to the questionnaire received from the Community
industry and are therefore confirmed.
5.2.3 General difficulties in the polyester sector
(108) The Indian exporting producers submitted that the decreasing prices of bi-axially
orientated polypropylene (BOPP) film would have a direct effect on PET film prices
in the packaging sector as the products are interchangeable from a PET film users
perspective. Therefore, they claimed that the prices would have in any case have
decreased with or without the increased imports of PET film into the Community.
(109) The Commission had to reject this argument as no evidence to support the claim has
been brought forward.
5.3 CONCLUSION ON CAUSATION
(110) In view of the above, the conclusion of recital 145 of the provisional duty Regulation
is confirmed.
6. COMMUNITY INTEREST
6.1 PRELIMINARY REMARK
(111) No new facts or arguments were submitted by any party with regard to the interest of
the Community industry, other Community producers or importers of PET film.
The findings of the provisional duty regulation are therefore confirmed, notably the
conclusions that the impact of measures on those groups would either be beneficial
(Community industry and non-captive other Community producers), neutral (captive
producers) or at most negative to a limited extend (importers).
6.2 INTEREST OF USERS OF THE PRODUCT CONCERNED
(112) As mentioned in recital 2, the Commission received comments from two users of the
product under consideration after the disclosure of the finding having led to
provisional measures. In the submissions of the users it was claimed that on the
contrary to the provisional findings PET film is an important raw material cost factor
for them and that production of downstream products based on PET film accounts for
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an important proportion of their total production. They claimed further that the price
increases of the Community industry would make it difficult for them to compete on
the downstream market against imports from South Korea, People’s Republic of
China and the USA. It was claimed further that there have been occasions when the
Community industry has refused to deliver certain quantities of PET film indicating
the existence of a lack of capacity. The Community industry was also alleged to have
refused to develop a non-standard film for the specific needs of one of the users
where an Indian producer has agreed to do so. Therefore, they claim that it is in the
interest of the users to maintain an alternative source of PET film originating in
India.
(113) The Commission maintains the arguments and conclusions presented in recital 153 of
the provisional duty Regulation as far as the overall share of PET film out of the total
production costs of users overall and the proportion overall of PET film based
downstream product of the users’ total production are concerned. As the analysis
concerned reflects an overall analysis, there can be individual cases in which PET
film may be a crucial raw material for a user. This, however, does not alter the
average overall results of the investigation. Furthermore, the investigation has shown
that even for certain users for whom PET film is an important cost factor, the imports
of PET film originating in India had a minor share in their total purchases of PET
film. Furthermore, the worries of the users concerning the disappearance of an
alternative source of imports in case of capacity shortage or need to develop a new
film type are unfounded as the countervailing duties will not exclude the Indian
exporting producers from the Community market. The duties will only remedy the
effect of an illegal, injurious subsidisation.
6.3 CONCLUSION ON COMMUNITY INTEREST
(114) In examining the various interests involved and all the above aspects, the
Commission can confirm that there are no compelling reasons not to take action
against the imports in question.
7. DEFINITIVE DUTY
(115) On the basis of the conclusions on subsidisation, injury, causal link and Community
interest, the Commission considers it necessary to adopt definitive countervailing
measures.
7.1 INJURY ELIMINATION LEVEL
(116) The Community industry suggested that a higher minimum profit margin than 6%
(set by the Commission in recital 156 of the provisional duty regulation) was
necessary. However, it is not important to define a conclusive percentage in this case
as, even on the lower figure used by the Commission, the injury margin is greater
than the subsidy margin. The Indian exporting producers made requests for
adjustments for level of trade and suggested a correction in the calculation method of
the underselling margins required to determine the injury elimination level. In
addition, MTZ requested an adjustment for quality differences. As set out in recitals
92 and 93 above, these requests had to be denied.
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7.2 FORM AND LEVEL OF DUTY
(117) Changes from the provisional determination of the amount of countervailable
subsidies have been made where appropriate. The rate of definitive countervailing
duty is accordingly lower than the level of provisional duty for all of the cooperating
Indian exporting producers.
(118) In accordance with Article 15(1) of the Basic Regulation, the countervailing duty rate
should correspond to the subsidy margin, unless the injury margin is lower. The
following rates of duty therefore apply for the cooperating producers:
– Ester Industries Ltd 12.0%
– Flex Industries Ltd 12.5%
– Garware Polyester Ltd 3.8%
– India Polyfilms Ltd 7.0%
– Jindal Polyester Ltd 7.0%
– MTZ Polyesters Ltd 8.7%
– Polyplex Corporation Ltd 19.1%
(119) Given the high level of cooperation, which covered more than 80% of imports into
the Community of the product concerned originating in India, it was considered
appropriate to establish the duty rate for non-cooperating companies at the same rate
as the highest rate that has been established for the cooperating companies, i.e.
19.1%. This level will ensure that no bonus is granted for non cooperation and that
duty evasion will be minimised.
(120) Recitals 159 and 160 of the provisional duty regulation are confirmed.
8. COLLECTION OF THE PROVISIONAL DUTY
(121) In view of the magnitude of the countervailable subsidies found for the exporting
producers and in light of the seriousness of the injury caused to the Community
industry, it is considered necessary that the amounts secured by way of provisional
countervailing duty under Regulation (EC) No 1810/99 be definitively collected to
the extent of the amount of definitive duties imposed.
9. PROPOSALS FOR UNDERTAKINGS
(122) Finally, it should be noted that the Commission services also received proposals for
price undertakings from five Indian exporting companies. The Commission services
investigated the said proposals and concluded that they cannot be sufficiently
monitored or managed due to the complexity of the product: About 160 minimum
prices would be required to cover all Indian product groupings and there were no
guarantees that the suggested organisation for monitoring the undertakings, the
Export Inspection Agency of India, has the mandate or the technical means to carry
out such a detailed control. Therefore, the Commission services had to reject the
received proposals for undertakings.
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HAS ADOPTED THIS REGULATION:
Article 1
1. A definitive countervailing duty is hereby imposed on imports of polyethylene
terephthalate (PET) film falling within CN codes ex 3920 62 19 (TARIC codes 3920 62
19.10, 3920 62 19.15, 3920 62 19.25, 3920 62 19.30, 3920 62 19.35, 3920 62 19.40, 3920
62 19.45, 3920 62 19.50, 3920 62 19.55, 3920 62 19.60, 3920 62 19.65, 3920 62 19.70,
3920 62 19.75, 3920 62 19.80, 3920 62 19.81, 3920 62 19.85, 3920 62 19.87, 3920 62
19.89, 3920 62 19.91) and ex 3920 62 90 (TARIC codes 3920 62 90.30, 3920 62 90.91),
originating in India.
2. The rate of duty applicable to the net free-at-Community-frontier price, before duty, shall
be as follows:
Produced by: Rate of duty
(%)
TARIC
additi
onal
code
Ester Industries Ltd
75-76, Amrit Nagar, Behind
N.D.S.E. Part -1, New Delhi –110
003, India
12.0% A026
Flex Industries Ltd
A-1, Sector-60,
Noida - 201 301 (U.P.), India
12.5% A027
Garware Polyester Ltd
50-A Swami Nityanand Marg,
Vile Parle (East) Mumbai – 400
057, India
3.8% A028
India Polyfilms Ltd
112, Indra Prakash Building
21, Barakhamba Road
New Delhi –110 001, India
7.0% A029
Jindal Polyester Ltd
115-117, Indra Prakash Building,
21, Barakhamba Road,
New Delhi –110 001, India
7.0% A030
MTZ Polyesters Ltd
Sarnath Centre,
Upvan Area, Upper Govind Nagar,
Malad (E),
Mumbai – 400 097, India
8.7% A031
Polyplex Corporation Ltd
2 Ring Road, Kilokri,
Opposite Maharani Bagh
New Delhi –110 014, India
19.1% A032
All other Indian companies 19.1% A999
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3. Unless otherwise specified, the provisions in force concerning customs duties shall apply.
Article 2
The amount secured by way of provisional countervailing duty pursuant to Regulation (EC)
No 1810/99 shall be definitively collected at the duty rate definitively imposed.
Amounts secured in excess of the definitive rate of countervailing duty shall be released.
Article 3
This Regulation shall enter into force on the day following that of its publication in the
Official Journal of the European Communities.
This Regulation shall be binding in its entirety and directly applicable in all Member States.
Done at …….., …………………1999
For the Council
